But not so with the role of women in the military. Exploring the progress of women in uniform alongside that of their civilian counterparts, this essay notes that the strides women in the military made-while incredible, and rightfully lauded-were met with greater resistance. As the Supreme Court was recognizing the need for increased scrutiny in gender discrimination cases, women in uniform were being denied access to most rates and billets in their respective service. 13 Just as women finally seemed to be making headway in gaining leadership positions, the United States sought to in- crease the size of the military and prepare for any number of real world scenarios that could escalate to World War III, 14 but the executive and legislative branches disagreed on the best way to do so. President Carter reinstated the draft with a provision to include women, but Congress elected to authorize the funds required to register only men. 15 The decision to keep women from registering for the draft was immediately challenged and quickly made its way to the United States Supreme Court. In Rostker v. Goldberg, 16 the Court upheld the provision, showing unwavering deference to Congressional findings despite the established intermediate scrutiny standard. 17 In the years that followed, women in the military had to overcome that stigma. With a little help from the Virginia Military Institute, decades of slow, silent soldiering on culminated in 2013 when Defense Secretary Carter ended the combat exclusionary rule for women and opened all military roles to women who qualify. 18 The Supreme Court may hear challenges in the coming terms regarding gender neutral draft registration, with the architect of intermediate scrutiny now on the other side of the bench.
II. THE DIVERGING LIVES OF WOMEN IN AND OUT OF UNIFORM
The 1960's and 70's-the "second-wave" of feminism-saw the women's movement, that had previously focused on suffrage and property rights, broaden to include sexuality, workplace equality, and reproductive rights. 19 Legal victories helped solidify the foundation for the movement, particularly the Equal Pay Act, 20 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,  21 Title IX,   22 and Griswold v. Connecticut, which struck down the state's ban on contraception under the now widely applied right to privacy found in the "penumbras" and "emanations" of other constitutional protections. As the movement gained momentum on the civilian front, women seeking to broaden their roles in the military found legal support as well. President Johnson signed Public Law 90-130 in 1967, which opened advanced military ranks to women (including General and Admiral) and lifted the two percent ceiling on the number of women in the military. 24 Then in 1975, President Ford signed Public Law 94-106, 25 authorizing women to be admitted into the service academies.
Even so, the push for gender parity in the armed services was met with greater opposition from both military and civilian leadership. While endorsing the law that opened advanced military ranks to women, the House Armed Services Committee nevertheless stated: "There cannot be complete equality between men and women in the matter of military careers. The stern demands of combat, sea duty, and other types of assignments directly related to combat are not placed upon women in our society." 26 The Committee further noted that " [t] he Defense Department assured [them] that there would be no attempt to remove restrictions on the kind of military duties women will be expected to perform." 27 General Hershey, former Director of the Selective Service System, echoed: "There is no question but that women could do a lot of things in the military service. So could men in wheelchairs. But you couldn't expect the services to want a whole company of people in wheelchairs." It's easy to view the long, slow road to military gender parity in a vacuum; fifty years after the Department of Defense "assured the committee" that women would remain barred from the majority of billets, the DoD rescinded the combat exclusion and eliminated all gender-based barriers to service. 29 In three generations, women went from total exclusion to formal parity. But women out of uniform faced an uphill battle as well and saw faster, broader progress. While many of the causes second-wave feminism fought for impacted women in uniform, there was no blueprint available for challenging gender discrimination in the military before the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) invested in women's rights and placed Ruth Bader Ginsburg at the helm. 30 Ruth Bader Ginsburg's effort as Director of the ACLU's Women's Rights Project deserves praise in its own right. Before Ginsburg argued for a higher standard of review for statutes that distinguish between citizens on the basis of gender, the U.S. Supreme Court had never found a gender classification unconstitutional.
31
"Ginsburg recognized the need for a well-developed, long-range strategy to chip away at precedent, to establish new principles incrementally, and to pave the way for changing the law on gender discrimination."
32
Prior to Ginsburg's time with the ACLU, the Supreme Court applied two standards of review to analyze an Equal Protection challenge to a statute: "rational basis," with maximum deference, or a "more stringent" test that would later be known as "strict scrutiny." 33 The more stringent test derived from Justice Harlan Stone's majority opinion in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co. 34 Nearly hidden in what would otherwise remain an "utterly unremarkable" decision, 35 Justice Stone noted that the deference afforded to economic regulations-the "rational basis" test-was "inadequate when dealing with fundamental rights, particularly in the case of 'discrete and insular minorities. '" 36 Out of that footnote grew the "strict scrutiny" standard. In legislation that does not implicate a fundamental right or a suspect class of "discrete and insular minorities," 37 courts will uphold the law so long as there is a rational basis for it. 38 However, if the legislation implicates a fundamental right or a "suspect class" of persons, 39 courts will strike down the law unless it is "narrowly tailored" to serve a "compelling government interest." 40 The strict scrutiny test has primarily been applied to statutes that distinguish between persons on account of their race, 41 but has also been used to strike For all the progress the movement made pressuring elected officials to pass gender parity legislation, 46 the laws were not rigorously enforced.
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Ginsburg thus "sought to challenge gender classification principles by educating the Court and the legal community of the changing roles of women. Ginsburg's initial step was 'to awaken the Supreme Court and begin to persuade the court to take seriously the argument that sex-based classifications [were] inherently suspect.'" 48 The problem with applying the strict scrutiny standard to laws that distinguish on the basis of gender is, first and foremost, that women make up half of the population. 49 While scholars may disagree on what "discrete and insular minorities" means, most agree that women, as a class, are not one. 50 Even so, Ginsburg "skillfully crafted the pattern for structuring her argument: focus on the strict scrutiny standard; identify the government objective; challenge the assumption and/or overbroad generalization about women; compare the status of 'similarly situated' males and females; and demonstrate the irrationality of the relationship between classification and government interest." In 1971, Ginsburg challenged an Idaho statute that created a preference for men as administrators of estates. 52 Because the "law assumed that men had more business experience and were better qualified as administrators," 53 she argued that "the civil status of women was no longer subject to general legal disabilities and sex, as an unalterable trait, should be considered a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause." 54 Comparing sex discrimination to segregation, Ginsburg focused her argument on the stereotypes of women often cited to justify discriminatory laws. 55 The Supreme Court was adequately persuaded, but not in the way Ginsburg hoped: it struck down the law because it lacked a rational basis. 56 The Court did not adopt strict scrutiny to analyze laws distinguishing on the basis of gender. 57 Ginsburg had another chance to convince the Court that heightened scrutiny was required in gender discriminatory statutes just eighteen months later. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 58 Ginsburg challenged statutes providing dependency benefits to all wives of servicemen, but not to all husbands of servicewomen. Brilliantly, by challenging gender classifications that formally favored women, Ginsburg was able to highlight how longstanding stereotypes lack rational basis and detrimentally impact both men and women. 59 The Court overturned the statute, but a plurality of only four Justices, led by Brennan, voted to adopt strict scrutiny. The other members of the eightJustice majority followed Reed to strike down the statute under rational basis. 60 Without a majority to support the application of strict scrutiny, Ginsburg began advocating for a middle ground-an intermediate standard of review. Focusing on Social Security cases, where widowers received fewer benefits than widows, and jury duty cases, where service was mandatory for men and voluntary for women, Ginsburg found "mixed results." 61 In one such social security case, a young woman died in childbirth and her widow- 62 The father obtained social security benefits, but the other available "mother's insurance benefits" were authorized for women only. 63 The Court unanimously struck down the statute, finding that the challenged classification was indistinguishable from the statute in Frontiero 64 and that "all parties were victims of invidious sex-discrimination."
65 Again, however, the Court declined to formally adopt heightened scrutiny.
Less than one year later, that changed. The Supreme Court heard Craig v. Boren, which challenged an Oklahoma law that allowed women to buy certain beer after turning eighteen whereas men were not allowed to do so until they turned twenty-one. 66 The ACLU did not represent the plaintiffs, but Ginsburg wrote an amicus brief arguing that sex classifications should be subject to heightened, though not necessarily strict, scrutiny and writing that "sex classification could not be justified on any basis." 67 The Court agreed. The majority found the law violated the Equal Protection Clause because it was not shown to be "substantially related to [the] achievement of the statutory objective."
68 That has now become the "intermediate scrutiny" standard-a law that distinguishes between individuals on the basis of sex must be "substantially related" to an "important government objective." On one hand, comparing the legal and societal progress of women in and out of uniform during the 1970's should be straightforward-like comparing apples to apples that sometimes wear an orange peel. As just one example, Frontiero challenged statutes providing dependency benefits to all wives of servicemen, but not to all husbands of servicewomen. 70 Invalidating that statute impacted many women, but it specifically impacted women in uniform who are married to a non-military spouse. But the hierarchy in place within the U.S. Armed Forces provides a legal and administrative system all its own. As a result, many of the women seeking to challenge discriminatory practices or policies in the military had to do so through administrative channels, often without the benefit of counsel and without the opportunity to find public support. 71 Even so, the comparison is useful in setting the stage for legislative and judicial response to the question of women and the draft.
Although President Johnson lifted the two percent ceiling on the number of women in the military in 1967, 72 each respective branch of the military could "prescribe the authorized strength of female enlisted and officer personnel."
73 This stymied any effect lifting the ban might have had. In 1973, the Secretaries of each branch chose to limit the number of female service members to less than two percent of the total service personnel.
74 By choosing to employ so few females compared to their male counterparts, the military was able to place more stringent demands on female applicants. Specifically, men could enlist at age seventeen, whereas women had to be older than eighteen. 75 Women with dependent children had to obtain a waiver to enlist, which was not required of male enlistees. 76 Women also needed to achieve higher scores on mental aptitude tests and had to possess higher educational certifications than their male counterparts. 77 Although barred from service specialties that require "heavy" labor, let alone combat, the minimum physical standard was more stringently applied to women than men as well.
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What is striking about those standards, of course, is that the United States was actively drafting young men into military service at that time. 79 The U.S. Military thought it was better served by drafting men into service than accepting more women who were volunteering to join. There is no data available on which to argue the United States could have avoided a draft had 71 Whether it was the result of the decision to end the draft and shift to an all-volunteer military force (AVF), the influence of the larger women's movement, or some combination of the two, women made tangible progress throughout the latter half of the 1970's towards military gender parity. 81 Without the draft, the Department of Defense increased recruiting goals for women; by 1976, one in every thirteen recruits was female (compared to one in thirty just four years prior).
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One of the most institutionalized barriers women faced was the opportunity to serve as an officer in the military. Female candidates for Army Officer Candidate School (OCS) needed two years of college and a mental aptitude score of 115; male candidates needed only a high school diploma or equivalent and an aptitude score of 110.
83 Direct appointments to a number of officer positions in the Navy and Marine Corps were statutorily limited to males 84 and the military's ROTC program only opened to women in 1970, and even then, was "available only on a limited, experimental basis." 85 For that reason, Public Law 94-106, which mandated female admission to the three major service academies (Army at West Point, Navy at Annapolis, and Air Force at Colorado Springs), was a monumental victory for women in the military. 86 The first women entered the service academies in 1976 and, unsurprisingly, were swiftly met with strong opposition. 87 But crucially, despite opposition both on and off campus, women were admitted to service academies and would be eligible to receive a commission through the academy starting in 1980. 88 With the service academies set to produce more female officers, the military found itself considering the billets these women would be eligible to fill. The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) had passed and was pending ratification. 89 No one knew whether the ERA would be ratified or what effect it might have on the role of women in the military. It was never ratified, 90 but some of the steps taken by the military indicate that leadership expected some formal mandate regarding the billets women could fill and opted to proactively "open-up" a number of roles to women.
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Weapons training became mandatory for women 92 and both the Army and Navy allowed women to enter pilot training. 93 For the first time, a woman was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General. 94 The U.S. Coast Guard reviewed the need for permanent female officers and found that, while there was "[n]o need for regular women officers . . . Nevertheless, considering all factors, it is in the overall best interest of the Coast Guard to begin a controlled women officer program with provisions for integration into the regular Coast Guard included." 95 The report concluded: "Planning and execution 1, 1979) , https://www.washingtonian.com/1979/11/01/jim-webb-women-cant-fight/ ("There is a place for women in our military, but not in combat. And their presence at institutions dedicated to the preparation of men for combat command is poisoning that preparation. By attempting to sexually sterilize the Naval Academy environment in the name of equality, this country has sterilized the whole process of combat leadership training, and our military forces are doomed to suffer the consequences.").
89 98 While women were not yet allowed on warships, female Sailors were assigned to service craft. 99 The courts helped too; in 1976, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals indicated that the Marine Corps policy of involuntarily discharging pregnant Marines violated the Due Process Clause.
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Although many rates and billets in each service remained closed to female service members, the tide had changed. Women were carving out a significant place for themselves in the military across all branches and ranks. In the context of the larger women's movement, with the support of President Carter (a Naval Academy graduate), 101 the barriers to gender parity in the military seemed to be falling. require, to increase the size and strength of our Armed Forces-and that capacity will itself help to maintain peace and to prevent conflict in the region of the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia."
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Crucially, President Carter recommended that the Act be amended so that the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA) extended to include women:
My decision to register women is a recognition of the reality that both women and men are working members of our society. It confirms what is already obvious throughout our society-that women are now providing all types of skills in every profession. The military should be no exception. In fact, there are already 150,000 women serving in our Armed Forces today, in a variety of duties, up from 38,000 only 10 years ago. They are performing well, and they have improved the level of skills in every branch of the military service.
There is no distinction possible, on the basis of ability or performance, that would allow me to exclude women from an obligation to register.
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President Carter's recommendations to reinstate the MSSA and to include women in the registration were then sent to Congress, who would need to pass funding for MSSA registration.
The issue was considered extensively in hearings, committee, and debate. In fact, debate over Carter's recommendations "dominated Congress for months, until Congress passed on June 25, 1980 . . . a statute funding registration for men only."
107 Nearly every analysis of the Rostker decision noted below nods to these extensive debates, largely due to the Court's reliance on such "careful consideration and debate.
108 But as at least one scholar noted:
In fact, the debate about Carter's proposal was not a break with the past, and fit smoothly within over a decade of debate over women's military roles. In 1980, powerful governmental and popular voices [-] whether for or against Carter's proposal[-]remained determined to limit women's military service in ways designed to maintain and enforce women's place in the family and civilian employment. Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist reversed the district court's decision. 113 The Court noted the intermediate scrutiny standard, but didn't appear to apply it with the same rigor it had been using: "The Court has struck down laws that discriminate on the basis of sex unless they are 'substantially related to an important governmental interest.' While Justice Rehnquist referred to that standard in his opinion, his overriding theme was that of judicial deference to the will of Congress." 114 That was not a controversial legal analysis; the opinion explicitly noted that "[t]he case arises in the context of Congress' authority over national defense and military affairs, and perhaps in no other area has the Court accorded Congress greater deference."
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To be sure, raising and supporting an army for the national defense 116 is an important government interest; no one in the case argued otherwise. But with the increased breadth of roles women filled in the armed services by 1981, the Court's decision to give what seems like rational-basis level deference to the findings of Congress suggests that issues involving women in the military have a different standard altogether. 117 Moreover, the decision fails to scrutinize the relationship between that interest and classification involved.
Justice Rehnquist seemed satisfied that, because women were barred from combat, registering only men was "substantially related" to the interests served in drafting service members. Yet, as noted above and outlined in the briefings for this case, less than fifteen percent of military roles were combatant. 118 When the district court heard the case it "did not agree that the justifications offered by the Government for an exclusively male draft registration were substantially related to the achievement of any important governmental interests." 119 In his dissent, Justice Marshall noted the same issue:
[A] gender-based classification cannot withstand constitutional challenge unless the classification is substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental objective. . . . Consequently, before we can sustain the MSSA, the Government must demonstrate that the gender-based classification it employs bears 'a close and substantial relationship to [the achievement of] important governmental objectives.' 120 Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and White, felt the government had not shown-as would be its burden under intermediate scrutiny-that drafting only men bore a close and substantial relationship to its objectives. To the contrary, Justice Marshall felt "there simply is no basis for concluding in this case that excluding women from registration is substantially related to the achievement of a concededly important governmental interest in maintaining an effective defense."
121 Marshall noted with incredulity the notion that Congress felt it needed to exclude women rather than amend the Act to authorize drafting different numbers of men and women or drafting into noncombatant roles (which it already did).
122 He concluded that:
neither the Senate Report itself nor the testimony presented at the congressional hearings provides any support for the conclusion the Court seeks to attribute to the Report-that drafting a limited number of women, with the number and the timing of their induction and training determined by the military's personnel requirements, 123 would burden military objectives in administration or training, as the Government challenged.
So why didn't the Court adhere to the intermediate scrutiny standard it established just a few years prior and continues to apply today? The opinion tends to signal that, when it comes to national defense, women are (potential) service members first and women second. That is, because deference to the legislature seems to be at its peak on matters of national security and 127 By excluding women from registration, Congress, and eventually the Supreme Court, seemed to state "that every man, regardless of any disability, must register, but that all women, regardless of competency, cannot." 128 This reinforced "the myth that all men are more competent than all women."
129
That sentiment remains, albeit far less prevalent. 130 Societal reticence notwithstanding, the legal justifications cited in Rostker no longer hold water. Although no challenges to the draft on the basis of gender discrimination have reached the Supreme Court since Rostker, all evidence seems to suggest the current Supreme Court would reverse course. And the Court may have such an opportunity: two lawsuits have already started to make their way through the courts. In February 2016, the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the National Coalition for Men, who challenged the exclusion of women from the draft on the grounds that it is a violation of Equal Protection. 131 The case is currently being reconsidered by the district court. Additionally pending is Kyle v. Selective Service, a case brought by a 17-year-old girl suing for the right to legally register for the Selective Service.
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A gender-neutral draft is the logical next step considering the evolving roles of women in the military. Notably:
The first woman to command a U.S. Navy warship did so in 1990. In 1991, women were cleared to fly fighter jets in combat; two years later, Congress authorized women to serve on combat ships at sea. 1998 marked the first female fighter pilots to fly combat missions off of an aircraft carrier. The first women to command a U.S. Navy warship and U.S. Air Force fighter squadron were given their commands in 1998 and 2004, respectively. By 2010, women were cleared to serve aboard submarines. According to the Army, by September 2015 '437 women earned awards for valor to include two Silver Stars, three Distinguished Flying Crosses, 31 Air Medals, and 16 Bronze Stars.' As Secretary Carter noted, between the 2013 memorandum and the 2015 policy change, we also saw 'women soldiers graduate from the Army's Ranger School.' 133 Since the combat exclusion has been lifted, the argument that the United States only drafted men for combat positions lacks even a tangential relationship to the stated goals of selective service registration. That said, the GOP's 2016 official platform sought "to exempt women from 'direct ground combat units and infantry battalions.'" 134 While this platform seems to be in contention with military leadership, 135 and even in contention with some prominent Republicans, 136 it is worth considering the fate of women and the draft in the event that the ban on women in combat is reinstated.
